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ABSTRACT 
Phishing continues to be a problem for both individuals and 
organisations, with billions of dollars lost every year. We propose 
the use of nudges – more specifically social saliency nudges – that 
aim to highlight important information to the user when evaluating 
emails.  We used Signal Detection Theory to assess the effects of 
both sender saliency (highlighting important fields from the sender) 
and receiver saliency (showing numbers of other users in receipt of 
the same email).  Sender saliency improved phish detection but did 
not introduce any unwanted response bias.  Users were asked to rate 
their confidence in their own judgements and these confidence 
scores were poorly calibrated with actual performance, particularly 
for phishing (as opposed to genuine) emails.  We also examined the 
role of impulsive behaviour on phish detection, concluding that 
those who score highly on dysfunctional impulsivity are less likely 
to detect the presence of phishing emails. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Phishing is a highly prevalent form of social engineering where an 
attacker steals sensitive information by sending fraudulent emails 
that purport to be from a trustworthy source.  Over time, phishing 
attacks have become both socially and contextually smarter, with 
the result that phishing continues to be a growing problem for 
organisations and individuals. In the best-case scenario, phishing 
results in lost productivity due to users deliberating over the 
authenticity of the email, but in the worst-case scenario individuals 
and businesses can suffer serious security, financial and/or 
reputation loss due to stolen credentials or leaked information. 
A large number of people fall for these phishing emails within 
experimental studies [25, 31, 38]. For example, McAfee’s Phishing 
Quiz [31] found that 80% of respondents (employees) fell for at 
least one phishing email – an alarmingly high percentage. A recent 
“in the wild” study showed that users do not only follow the link, 
they go on to provide their credentials to the website. This study, 
by Bursztein et al. [6], examined the effectiveness of phishing 
websites by analysing internet traffic through Google, and found 
that the most successful phishing web page resulted in 45% of page 
views converting into captured user credentials. However, not all 
webpage visits successfully converted to captured credentials, 
while an average conversion rate of 14% was found across all the 
websites they looked at. To deal with this issue, researchers have 
focused on two core strategies: either improving the filtering 
algorithms that can reduce the number of phishing emails that make 
it into users’ inboxes (e.g. [3, 9]) or developing interventions, 
mainly training and education, that help users identify fraudulent 
emails (e.g. [40]). Despite these efforts, both individuals and 
organisations continue to fall for phishing scams and billions of 
dollars are lost every year – the Monthly Online Fraud Report for 
January 2015 estimates losses of over $4.5 billion for 2014 [37]. 
In the current study, we focus on the second of these strategies, 
exploring interventions that might support the user in the detection 
of fraudulent emails.  In particular, we wanted to explore the effect 
of making the broader social context of the email more salient.  We 
did this firstly by highlighting the name of the sender along with 
the time the email was sent, recognising that genuine emails are 
typically exchanged during certain social or business hours; and 
secondly, by highlighting the number of people in an organisation 
or network that received that same email, recognising that genuine 
emails are targeted at specific individuals or groups, while phishing 
emails are more socially indiscriminate. 
2. Background Research 
As we have noted, attempts to deal with the phishing problem 
embrace both technical and human-centric solutions.  Technical 
solutions have generally focused on identifying suspicious 
websites, for example using browser plugins or identifying 
characteristic elements of a phishing email, e.g. [16].  Filtering 
algorithms can also bring improvements, e.g., [3, 9], however such 
phishing tools are not always accurate – some phish are missed and 
some genuine items are flagged as phish, i.e. there are problems 
with false positives and negatives [50].    
The human-centric solutions typically fall into one of three 
categories involving (i) educational or training interventions; (ii) 
new designs and visualisations that can help ‘nudge’ users to make 
better decisions and (iii) work that considers individual differences 
in decision-making.  Our work primarily addresses the latter two 
categories, but we will briefly consider some of the educational 
initiatives below. 
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 2.1 Campaigns and Educational Interventions 
Users are unlikely to take effective action against phishing attacks 
unless they are both aware of the risks inherent in online 
communication and are also knowledgeable about the specific 
threats posed by dubious emails.  Indeed, researchers have shown 
that the perceived risk of cybercrime can moderate users’ 
willingness to take risks in a variety of online environments [36] 
and that the ability to evaluate deceptive cues was a major factor in 
online protection [22]. Further, users’ cybersecurity (i.e., phishing) 
knowledge is positively related to their attitude and intention 
toward adopting and using cybersecurity (anti-phishing) solutions 
[46]. It is unsurprising, then, that a number of educational 
interventions designed to improve user understanding of risk and 
knowledge of how to mitigate risk have been developed.  These 
interventions adopt a wide range of different training techniques 
that can include embedded training systems [28] motivational 
cartoons [29] and even games that raise awareness and train users 
for future encounters [41]. However, they have been met with 
limited success.  Users start with a very poor awareness of their 
vulnerability to being phished [23, 46] and may ignore the training 
altogether [8]. Added to that, the phishing emails become more 
sophisticated year on year - to the point where even security experts 
are unable to determine whether the item is genuine or not [18]. 
2.2 Behavioural Interventions 
When seeking to influence user behaviour, we must be mindful that 
people are reluctant to spend much time and effort engaging in 
protective privacy or security measures [24, 39]. Many 
cybersecurity interventions are unproductive and unhelpful in the 
sense that they take time and effort away from the users’ primary 
task.   This productivity argument is important, as employers often 
do not appreciate how much time is lost due to staff deliberating 
the legitimacy of emails. Of course, the costs to organisations can 
be much worse when employees get this wrong and when 
companies are then laid open to serious cybersecurity threats and 
can incur significant financial and/or reputation loss. 
However, we should also be aware of the vulnerabilities exhibited 
by users during the regular processes of communicating by email.  
Ferreira et al., [20] note that the principle of Liking, Similarity & 
Deception (LSD) rules in this context – as people simply tend to  
believe in what others do or say as a default, unless they have good 
reason to suspect something is really wrong or they find a particular 
behaviour is completely unexpected.  With this in mind, many 
researchers have turned to the principles derived from behavioural 
economics in order to design a range of seamless cybersecurity 
“nudges” (see [43]) or visualisations [10, 11] that help move the 
user away from this default position, so that they make better 
choices, but choices that do not require too much additional effort 
on their part.  Behavioural nudges are already popular in the privacy 
field, with successful examples being found in relation to reduced 
Facebook sharing [47] and improved smartphone privacy settings 
[1]. They are also becoming popular as cybersecurity interventions, 
e.g. in relation to the risks associated with the selection and 
installation of apps on mobile phones [10]. For phishing, the 
existing interventions typically seek to make the trustworthiness of 
the linked webpage more salient within the web browser.  For 
example, Chou et al. [12] proposed SpoofGuard, a toolbar that gave 
pages a Spoof Score to help the user evaluate the likelihood that the 
page is not genuine. This score is based on a URL check (whether 
URL appears to be genuine), an image check that includes logos 
(e.g. detecting that an eBay logo does not sit on a non-eBay.com 
domain), a link check (check that all links in the page point to the 
current or same domain), and a password check (if page requires 
password, then more scrutiny is needed).  An experimental system 
called CATINA [51] employed such an approach to obtain a 97% 
accuracy rate in recognising the phishing websites it examined, 
with a 6% false positive rate.  However, these technical approaches 
rely on a page being reported as a phishing site before they can be 
used. Other interventions have explored the effectiveness of 
browser warnings, including toolbars. This work has generally 
found warnings and toolbars ineffective (e.g. [48]) – in part due to 
the user ignoring them. However, further work exploring the design 
of the phishing warnings on browsers found that active warnings – 
those requiring an action from the user to be dismissed – were 
clearly more effective than passive warnings [17].   
Other behavioural interventions have focused upon email 
attachments, which pose a known security problem [14]. 
Polymorphic Dialogs have been proposed for opening email 
attachments where, for example, the order of the options might 
change regularly in order to prevent habituation (or automatic 
skipping), and a timer can be introduced that forces the user to study 
and evaluate other options [5].  However, unsurprisingly, such 
interventions can significantly increase the time taken to complete 
simple tasks – again, resulting in unacceptable productivity costs 
for the end user [2].   
There have not been many interventions to support the user in 
detecting the phishing emails themselves within the email client. 
The aforementioned Polymorphic Dialogue [5] is an example of an 
intervention built into the email client to deal with attachments, 
while PhishDuck [49] is another example of a client-based 
extension designed to deal with phishing links. When a suspicious 
link is clicked by users, PhishDuck displays a popup asking for 
confirmation of the action, and presents a suggestion that they may 
have intended to use a different link (e.g. paypal.com instead of 
paipal.com). A user study found that participants using the 
extension followed significantly less phishing links than those 
using the default email client warning message. 
Some email providers and clients will present warnings to users 
when discrepancies are detected. For example, Gmail displays a 
banner warning on the top of a message if the email claims to be 
from a Gmail address but has not been authenticated as such [44] 
and while this can be a very useful indicator, it only applies to 
emails from the same domain. The Mozilla Thunderbird email 
client also displays a banner warning at the top of the email 
message when (internal) discrepancies are identified [45], but also 
incorporates the use of a pop up warning requiring the user to click 
on a continue button if they click on any links within the message. 
Once again, this fall-back system relies on the automated detection 
of features within the message that earlier spoofed the spam filter. 
Finally, it is possible to set up Microsoft Outlook so that users are 
not able to click on links within emails, but must instead copy and 
paste (or retype) the URL directly into the web browser. However, 
this does not attempt to assess if the email is a potential phish and 
may result in non-discriminatory behaviour from the user to 
minimise productivity disruption. 
2.3 Individual Differences in Susceptibility to 
Attacks 
We already know something about the kinds of people likely to be 
most vulnerable in a phishing attack.  For example, females are 
more prone than males to misclassifying phishing emails as 
 genuine [25, 26, 29, 40]. Halevi et al. [23] found a relationship 
between neuroticism and susceptibility to phishing attacks and 
various work has found that extroverts, more trusting individuals, 
and those open to new experiences were more vulnerable to 
phishing attacks [25, 33]. In contrast, Pattinson et al. [35] reported 
that extraverts and individuals scoring high for openness managed 
phishing emails better, which they acknowledge as a counter-
intuitive finding, but also reported a marginal effect of impulsivity, 
with those scoring high for impulsivity showing greater 
susceptibility to phishing attacks, while Modic and Lea [33] hint at 
an effect of impulsivity by reporting that Premeditation (an item of 
their impulsivity scale) was the best predictor for scam response 
rate in their scam compliance survey. Finally, in a recent study of 
attitudes and behaviours online, Riek et al. [36] have also found an 
interesting relationship between user confidence, risk perception 
and the use of online services. Specifically, more confident users 
have a higher chance of becoming victimized, although they are 
also more able to identify cybercriminal attacks. This is in contrast 
with other work in phishing where a positive relationship has been 
reported between performance (identification) and confidence [7].  
In the current study, we have tried to explore nudges that can alert 
the user to the possible presence of a phishing email.  These are 
simple visual cues that build upon the social premise of a phishing 
attack – wherein a user is socially engineered to believe that the 
email comes from a genuine source (e.g. because the sender is 
known or the content of the email seems appropriate).  However, 
we go further in providing cues that make the social context of the 
sender more salient (highlighting the name and address of the 
sender, and the time the email was sent) and the social context of 
the recipient more salient (highlighting the number of other 
recipients of that email). We loosely based our two nudges on 
existing work from other security and privacy contexts, notably 
installation dialogues that highlight the vendor’s name [4] for the 
former and audience saliency from social media work [47] for the 
latter (see Section 3.1 for full details). 
We hypothesise that each of these should improve phish detection, 
but we also explore individual differences in user susceptibility to 
phishing emails, by measuring both functional and dysfunctional 
impulsivity [13] and user confidence in their own cybersecurity 
decision-making. 
3. Methodology 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the two nudges, we set up 
an online experiment via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk where 
participants were asked to view 18 emails (6 phishing, 12 real) and 
decide whether each email represented a genuine message or a 
phishing message. The emails were designed by the researchers but 
were modelled on real messages received within the previous 3 
months. The phishing emails, specifically, were faithful 
reproductions of emails that had been problematic (as reported by 
the I.T. department) within the university during that time period. 
3.1 Design 
The study had a 2 x 2 independent measures design. The first factor, 
sender saliency, was created by highlighting sender features on the 
email that included name, email address and the time the email was 
received.  This factor had two levels (highlighted, not highlighted).  
It was chosen, in part, to exploit the social nature of a phishing 
attack where senders may seem familiar [16] but in all likelihood, 
the normal “social hours” of that sender would be understood (e.g. 
it would be unusual to receive an email from a colleague or from a 
local organisation at 1am). Although the name of the sender can be 
spoofed, it is common of phishing emails to contain discrepancies 
between the name of the sender and the original email address. In 
essence, the sender saliency nudge also aimed to expose any 
discrepancies in the address field of the emails thereby reducing the 
likelihood that users would be lured into a false sense of trust. This 
nudge was modelled on similar security work on installation 
dialogues showing that highlighting the vendor’s details to direct 
users’ attention to potential discrepancies led to more secure 
behaviour  [4]. The sender saliency nudge could be easily deployed 
in an organisation or to individual users through an email client 
plug in or using a browser extension. 
The second factor, receiver saliency was created by informing the 
user of the number of people within their organisation that also 
received a version of the email. Again, there were two levels of this 
factor (receiver information present or absent).  This factor was 
designed to exploit the social context of emails, in that genuine 
emails are constructed for a particular audience or individual, 
whereas a spear phishing email from a compromised account may 
be sent to multiple unrelated recipients. Whilst we recognise that 
mass emails from popular services (e.g. PayPal) may be sent to 
multiple recipients, the content or lure often appears to be highly 
personal “Ms x, your account may have been compromised, so 
please click here to change your password”). If a user is alerted to 
the fact that a seemingly personal message has been sent to many 
colleagues, they may question the validity of that message.  The 
converse may also be true – i.e. if they receive a message that 
should, by its nature, have been distributed to whole organisation 
(e.g. using a standard mailing list) and yet they are the sole 
recipient, then again, they may re-evaluate the legitimacy of that 
message. This nudge was loosely based on the Picture Nudge [47] 
on Facebook demonstrating that unintended information disclosure 
could be minimised by alerting the users to the post’s target 
audience. In our case, we have reversed the paradigm where the 
user instead gets a visual measure of the message’s intended 
audience. The likely deployment of the receiver saliency nudge 
would be in an organisation where email data can be easily 
collected to inform the nudge’s numerical output.    
3.2 Participants 
A Human Intelligence Task (HIT) was posted on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) stating that we were looking for users 
willing to help out with an email-sorting task. Participants were 
given a flat fee of $0.45 for completing the task which had an 
average completion time of 10 minutes, mirroring the payment 
structure of other studies at the time. The inclusion criteria for 
taking part in the study were a minimum age of 18, a good level of 
English, and a Number of HITs Approved greater than or equal to 
50 (for quality purposes). Participants on mobile devices were 
excluded from participating to control the viewing experience of 
the emails.   
We set recruitment targets based on an a priori power analysis 
suggesting 279 participants for a medium effect, with a final sample 
of 281 participants then completing the task to the required standard 
(see Table 1 for details). No attention checks were employed in the 
experiment, but the data provided was inspected for validity in 
terms of the time spent on the task: The work from workers who 
spent two or less seconds on average per email was rejected and 
new workers were found to complete the study. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of the four groups (sender salience cue 
present/absent; receiver salience cue present/absent).  
 Table 1: Participant demographics (F=Female; M=Male; 
U=Undisclosed). 
Nudge N Mean Age F M U 
None 
(Control) 65 34.5 29 34 2 
Sender 64 35.7 31 32 1 
Receiver 79 31.7 31 45 3 
Combined 73 32.3 20 52 1 
Total 281 33.6 111 163 7 
3.3 Materials 
The 18 emails were presented to participants as static images, with 
6 designed as the target phishing emails and the remaining 12 as 
genuine (see Appendix A.1). Phishing emails were (loosely) 
matched with genuine emails in terms of the time of day they were 
received and the percentages of colleagues flagged as also receiving 
the messages (receiver saliency nudge). This was done by matching 
six of the genuine emails with the features of the phishing emails 
(i.e. similar time of day they were received) while the remaining 6 
were chosen to reflect the overall established patterns of that set 
(e.g. most emails received during working hours). Note that this 
approach is rather conservative, in that we are deliberately reducing 
the simple effectiveness of our time of day cue as a signal of 
whether emails are genuine or not, but we are operating on the 
assumption that some genuine emails may reasonably be received 
at night (e.g. emails from another continent) and that by alerting 
users to time sent, we are encouraging them to check the other 
aspects of the email more carefully. 
 
Figure 1: Example phishing email showing both nudges – 
sender (highlights left) and receiver (box right). 
All messages were placed under an image of the Microsoft Outlook 
Ribbon bar (see Figure 1) to provide a frame of reference to 
participants.  The “to” field in each email was edited to show James 
Nicholas as the receiver and any personal or identifiable 
information within the email body was edited with generic 
information. 
The emails chosen for this study covered a basic range of possible 
senders and were matched across phishing and genuine messages: 
emails from well-known providers (e.g. Amazon, PayPal, eBay), 
emails from smaller organisations (Spotify, Eversure) and emails 
from individuals. We chose emails that contained links to websites 
as these are the most common type of phishing attack by volume 
[42] although in practice the nudges should work in the same 
manner with emails containing attachments. 
The website was hosted on our own server but the recruitment was 
facilitated through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
We note that the phishing emails, modelled on problematic 
phishing emails received within the university, were designed to 
always present a cue as to their authenticity to overcome the 
limitation of having no active links: when the sender metadata 
(to/from/subject) did not show a clear discrepancy to allow an 
informed choice, the links in the body of the message were not 
masked or obscured (similar to previous work [7]). 
3.4 Measures 
The main dependent variable was whether the user classified each 
email as either genuine or a phish. This was a binary decision, but 
the time taken to make a decision (in seconds) on each email was 
also recorded, starting when the page loaded and concluding when 
the radio button for the decision was pressed. Finally, participants 
were asked to rate how confident they were with their own 
classification of the email as genuine or phish, using a drop-down 
menu with options ranging from 0% to 100% confident in 
increments of 10%.  
In addition, participants were asked to complete an impulsiveness 
personality questionnaire at the end. Impulsiveness has been linked 
with susceptibility to phishing emails in previous work (e.g. [28, 
35]). Despite weak associations, the trends reported are interesting 
enough to warrant further exploration of this aspect of personality 
in our study.  We used a reduced version of Dickman’s Impulsivity 
Inventory [13] and the final scale consisted of 6 items measuring 
functional impulsivity (acting without much forethought, to 
maximise efficiency), with an internal reliability of 0.670 
(Cronbach’s Alpha) and 6 dysfunctional impulsivity items (acting 
without much forethought, but with undesirable consequences), 
with an internal reliability of 0.856.  
3.5 Procedure 
The experiment was initially framed as an email-sorting task on the 
MTurk HIT, but once participants clicked through to the homepage 
of the study, they were given more specific instructions telling them 
they would be required to identify phishing emails. This initial 
deception was put in place to prevent the recruitment of individuals 
only interested in computer security. Once on the website, they 
were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups and 
given the task instructions: they must look through 18 emails that 
were received by a person called James Nicholas and classify the 
message as either a genuine email or as a phishing email. After each 
decision, participants then provided a confidence score for their 
decision and progressed to the next message. Once all messages 
had been classified they were thanked and given a code to enter on 
the Mechanical Turk page. Participants received their payment 
once their work was reviewed by the research team. 
4. Results 
4.1 Scoring 
The absolute user judgement of genuine/phish was scored in terms 
of classical signal detection theory, i.e. as a hit, a miss, a true 
negative or a false positive.  In our task, hit rate refers to phishing 
emails that were correctly identified as phishing emails. False 
positive rate (or false alarms) refers to genuine emails that were 
incorrectly identified as phishing. Signal detection theory was 
 developed to determine the sensitivity of a participant to the 
presence of a target (phishing emails) against a background of noise 
(genuine emails).  The discriminability index d’ is a statistic used 
in signal detection that provides the separation between the means 
of the signal and the noise distributions in units of standard 
deviation of noise distributions. d’ was calculated using the 
equation:  
 
d’ = Z(phish hit rate) − Z(false positive rate) 
 
Bias in decision-making (i.e. whether users tend to classify things 
as phish or as genuine, irrespective of accuracy) is measured via the 
Beta statistic (b). Beta, is a statistic that provides a measurement of 
the extent to which one response is more probable than another and 
is calculated using the equation:  
 
b = exp{d’ x C}, where C= ϑ – {d’/2} 
 
The two other measures generated by our design (and used in the 
calculation of Beta) are Miss Rate – referring to phishing emails 
that were identified as genuine emails and True Rejection Rate – 
genuine emails that were identified as such by the participant. We 
refer readers to relevant texts (e.g. [7, 32]) for further information 
on this method. 
4.2 Sensitivity to Phishing Emails 
We ran three independent t-tests on the sensitivity (d’) scores, 
comparing the control (no nudge) condition with the other 
experimental conditions (sender saliency nudge, receiver saliency 
nudge, and combined nudges).  Means for d’ in each condition are 
presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Sensitivity d' (higher is better) for each nudging 
condition (range: -4.53 - 4.53). 
Nudge N Mean (d’) 
None (Control) 65 0.59 
Sender 64 0.98 
Receiver 79 0.87 
Combined 73 0.92 
Total 281 0.79 
 
These planned comparisons revealed a significant improvement in 
phish detection (d’) when sender saliency cues were employed 
(t(127)=2.080, p=.020) but no significant difference when receiver 
saliency cues were employed (t(142)=1.498, p=.068). We also 
found improved performance against the control when the cues 
were combined, i.e. when both sender and receiver salience cues 
were present (t(142)=1.667, p=.049). An additional t-test between 
the sender saliency and the receiver saliency cues reported no 
significant differences between the two (t(141)=.598, p=.551). 
4.3 Bias 
We compared the bias (b) score for each nudging condition against 
the control to determine whether the nudges influenced the 
likelihood of participants to respond “phish” or “genuine” 
irrespective of what was actually presented. Means for b can be 
seen on Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Bias b (low = tendency to select "phish", high = 
tendency to select “genuine”). 
Nudge N Mean (b) 
None (Control) 65 1.90 
Sender 64 1.47 
Receiver 79 1.87 
Combined 73 1.65 
Total 281 1.73 
 
Again, planned independent t-tests were made of the experimental 
conditions against the control.  There were no statistically 
significant differences when comparing the sender saliency 
condition (t(127)=1.439, p=.153), the receiver saliency condition 
(t(142)=0.100, p=.920), or the combined cues conditions 
(t(136)=0.773, p=.441) against the control.  Thus, the improved 
detection performance for sender salience and combined conditions 
noted above were not associated with any change in the 
participants’ bias in terms of a tendency to classify emails as phish 
or as genuine.  
4.4 Decision Time 
While participants’ sensitivity to phishing emails and their bias 
were the main variables under investigation, the time taken to make 
each decision was considered important in the light of the drive 
towards productive security solutions. The time taken to decide on 
individual emails ranged from 3 seconds to 117 seconds, with a 
mode of 9 seconds. We note that only 1.3% of decisions were made 
in 3 seconds, evenly spread across participants. Table 4 presents the 
mean number of seconds required to select a response per email. 
 
Table 4: Average time taken to make a decision on an email 
(seconds per email). 
Nudge N Mean (seconds) 
None (Control) 65 19.91 
Sender 64 20.28 
Receiver 79 18.18 
Combined 73 18.79 
Total 281 19.22 
 
We found no significant difference in time taken to make a decision 
when comparing each of the experimental conditions against the 
control, i.e. no difference for sender salience (t(127)=0.208, 
p=.836), for receiver salience (t(142)=0.975, p=.331), or for the 
combined condition (t(136)=0.725, p=.470).  Thus, the 
improvements in detection accuracy, presented above, do not incur 
a time penalty and should not lead to productivity losses. 
4.5 Calibration of Confidence 
We noted earlier the importance of well calibrated confidence in 
making risk decisions.  In this study, we measured user confidence 
in each email judgment and mean confidence ratings are given in 
Table 5, below.   
 
 
 Table 5: Confidence (%) indicated by participants per choice. 
Nudge N Mean (%) 
None (Control) 65 68.24 
Sender 64 69.63 
Receiver 79 69.89 
Combined 73 67.12 
Total 281 68.73 
 
We then constructed confidence calibration curves for both the 
phishing and the genuine emails. A calibration curve is a graph 
where subjective confidence of being correct is plotted against the 
actual performance (in this case percentage confidence is measured 
against percentage accuracy).  The curves are created by computing 
the mean accuracy of those items where participants have given a 
particular confidence score.  On each figure, the diagonal or identity 
line shows perfect calibration.  Any data points above this line show 
under-confidence and points below the line show over-confidence.  
To take one example, a data point that shows 80% on the x-axis and 
40% on the y-axis is showing that when we aggregate those emails 
in which the mean confidence rating is 80%, the mean accuracy rate 
for those same emails is only 40% (i.e. participants are over-
confident).  Thus good calibration would be indicated by data 
curves forming close to the diagonal or identity line and poor 
calibration would be shown by deviation from this line [30]. 
If we look firstly at the calibration curves for genuine emails 
(Figure 2) then we can see that under-confidence predominates – 
users are generally more accurate than they believe themselves to 
be.  However, there appears to be a linear trend, suggesting that 
greater confidence is generally associated with better accuracy and 
there is some suggestion that the two ‘nudges’ of cueing sender and 
receiver salience can act to improve calibration of confidence. 
Turning now to the calibration curves for phishing emails (Figure 
3) then we can see how poorly calibrated user confidence is for 
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Figure 2: Calibration Curve for genuine emails. The identity line shows perfect calibration with 
underconfident responses plotted above and underconfident responses plotted below. 
Figure 3: Calibration Curve for phishing emails. The identity line shows perfect calibration with 
underconfident responses plotted above and underconfident responses plotted below. 
 these items – with no overall sense that users are sensitive to their 
own ability to detect phish.   The improvements in phish detection 
that gave rise to the significant d’ score in the sender salience 
condition is reflected here in the solid line being associated with 
higher accuracy rates, but what is fascinating is that the cue that 
gives rise to improved accuracy cannot be harnessed to give users 
a better sense of how well they are doing in making this judgment.   
4.6 Impulsivity 
We used the scores on the Dickman scales to identify the top and 
bottom quartiles for both functional and dysfunctional impulsivity 
(i.e. we created four groups with approximately 60 participants per 
group and used the top scoring and bottom scoring groups for the 
analysis while discarding the middle two groups).  We then 
conducted t-tests to compare these groups and found no significant 
effect of functional impulsivity (again taking d’ as the measure of 
phishing sensitivity) (t(157)=1.348, p=.179). However, for the 
dysfunctional trait we found a significant difference in sensitivity 
to phishing emails between high and low scorers (t(142)=2.987, 
p=.003) where participants who scored high in dysfunctional 
impulsivity were relatively poor at detecting phish (d’=0.62) when 
compared to those with those who scored low on the trait (d’=1.13).   
These findings beg the question of whether or not the different 
nudges we have designed would be particularly effective as 
“protective measures” for those with dysfunctional impulsivity, but 
here we hit an analysis problem as we have not controlled for 
dysfunctional impulsivity in our allocation of participants to groups 
and so have a variable distribution of ‘dysfunctional impulsives’ 
across cells compounded by a relatively low n which makes us 
reluctant to undertake an inferential analysis.  For completeness, 
however, we give the sensitivity scores (d’) and standard deviations 
for each of the conditions in Table 6, below. 
Table 6: Phishing sensitivity (d’) by condition for high and low 
impulsives. 
Nudge N High dysfunctional impulsivity d’ (s.d.) N 
Low 
dysfunctional 
impulsivity d’ 
(s.d.) 
None 
(Control) 14 0.15 (0.97) 12 0.67 (1.08) 
Sender 15 0.98 (1.17) 11 1.12 (0.63) 
Receiver 16 0.58 (1.25) 15 1.60 (1.07) 
Combined 19 0.79 (1.21) 21 1.19 (1.44) 
   Finally, we found a significant difference between those scoring 
high vs. low on dysfunctional impulsivity on the time taken to make 
decisions, using a non-parametric Mann Whitney U test due to the 
non-normal distribution of data (U=1803.5, p<0.01). High 
dysfunctional impulsives made faster decisions on average (mean 
= 15.90s) than low dysfunctional impulsives (mean = 18.27s). 
5. Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether we can use the 
social context of sending and receiving emails to improve 
participants’ ability to detect phish. We highlighted information 
about either sender (name, email address, and the time the email 
was sent) or receiver (number of people in the organisation who 
received the email) as two means of nudging people to think more 
carefully about the communicative context of the email.  These two 
nudges individually and in combination were tested against a 
control where users were simply shown the email in its original, 
non-altered format. 
We found that improving sender saliency led to better phish 
detection when compared with a control and that sender and 
receiver nudges used in combination also improved performance, 
although there was no real sense of any added value from the 
receiver nudge.  The improvements were not associated with any 
overall bias in terms of participants’ inclination to decide “phish” 
or “genuine”.  We also found that participants were under-confident 
in their decisions when presented with genuine emails, but were 
over-confident when presented with phishing emails.  Finally, we 
found that participants who scored high on the trait of dysfunctional 
impulsivity [13] were less accurate in identifying phishing emails 
and made faster decisions than those scoring low for the trait.  
These results are discussed in more detail below. 
5.1 Performance with Nudges 
The sender saliency nudge presented alone and in combination with 
a receiver saliency nudge improved phish detection over the control 
condition. In other words, the simple act of highlighting fields that 
are already present in an email – sender’s name, email address and 
time sent – was an effective means of improving user security – a 
finding that is consistent with other work that suggests persuading 
users to attend to such information can help users with phish 
identification [16].  Users already rate these features as important 
for identifying phishing emails, with 95% of lay participants 
reporting that they use the “from” field to pick out discrepancies 
between email and sender name [15]. However, it seems that this 
knowledge is not being applied in practice – even under those 
circumstances where participants had been instructed to look for 
phishing emails. We should also note that the email address field is 
by default hidden in several popular email clients. For example, on 
Gmail’s web interface a user is required to hover over the sender’s 
name in order to bring up the email address (after a few seconds’ 
delay), and in Microsoft Outlook the user has to perform a number 
of steps in order to be able to see the origin email address. These 
practices are unlikely to help users in spotting discrepancies in 
emails and should be avoided. 
Our results show that participants using the receiver saliency nudge 
(i.e. indicating how many other people were in receipt of the email) 
did not perform significantly better than participants viewing the 
email without nudges (control). It is possible that the wording used 
for the receiver saliency condition – highlighting the percentage of 
“colleagues” who also received the email – was not descriptive 
enough for participants, and a more detailed approach similar to 
that employed by Wang et al. [47] where specific individuals are 
named may work better. However, the privacy implications of such 
an implementation in an organisation should first be considered.  
We did not find any associated effect on bias (i.e. participants were 
no more likely to select “phish” overall when nudged, irrespective 
of whether the email was or was not genuine).  This is important, 
as nudges that simply make people more or less conservative 
overall (without improving sensitivity) could have unfortunate 
consequences, leading to either the rejection of genuine emails or 
the acceptance of fraudulent emails. 
5.2 Confidence in Phish Detection 
Parsons et al. [34] have shown that participants are more accurate 
at identifying phishing emails when they know they are taking part 
in a phishing experiment.  However, our participants were rather 
poor at phish detection, and more worrying, were not well 
 calibrated in terms of the confidence they placed in their own 
judgements, further supporting previous work emphasising the 
importance of self-confidence when identifying phishing emails 
[7]. In other words, there was a discrepancy between subjective 
confidence and objective performance when classifying emails and 
this discrepancy seemed particularly problematic for phishing 
emails, where participants were generally poor at detecting phish 
(i.e. showed lower accuracy levels) but were overconfident that 
they made the right decision.  On the other hand, for genuine 
emails, participants showed better calibration in confidence scores, 
although showed an overall pattern of under-confidence.  This 
finding is interesting and is probably worth pursuing further. It is 
conceivable that users employ different cues for the detection of 
genuine emails than they do for the detection of phish but we would 
need to explore this issue in future studies.  For the moment, we 
might note that good calibration of confidence essentially depends 
on both the amount and the strength of the evidence available in 
supporting the choice [27].  For phish decisions, users have 
relatively poor sources of evidence available and this is likely to be 
compounded by their inability to assess the quality of that evidence.  
5.3 Impulsivity and Phish Detection 
Previous work has suggested that impulsivity may play a role in 
phish detection. For instance, less impulsive people have been 
found to manage email better (i.e. spot phishing more efficiently) 
than those scoring high for the trait, based on the Cognitive 
Reflection Task [35]. It should be noted, however, that this result 
pertained to participants who were aware that they were taking part 
in a phishing task (i.e. were vigilant). Kumaraguru et al. [28] also 
found a trend where participants with lower Cognitive Reflective 
Task scores (i.e. with higher impulsivity) were more likely to click 
on phishing emails, although in this case the trend was not 
statistically significant.   
Our results are consistent with these findings, but here we have 
used Dickman’s distinction between functional and dysfunctional 
impulsivity, finding that only the dysfunctional scale is associated 
with poor phish detection.  What is encouraging, is that our sender 
saliency intervention would appear to be effective even for those 
with low impulsivity (Table 5) however we have been reluctant to 
conduct any inferential statistics on these data as the power would 
be rather low, given the relatively small cell sizes and of course we 
have not systematically controlled for levels of impulsivity across 
the intervention conditions.   
5.4 The Use of Signal Detection Theory in 
Phishing Research 
In the past, phishing research and email classification in general 
typically analysed results using separate measures for success rate 
and false positives (e.g. [40]) or simply an accuracy measurement 
(e.g. [14, 19, 21, 28, 35]). This results in a simple ratio that indicates 
how comfortable users are identifying phish but neglects false 
alarms (i.e. incorrectly classifying a genuine email as a phish).  Yet 
false alarms are becoming a concern for organisations as they are 
associated with productivity and/or business losses that arise when 
staff ignore legitimate emails. Additionally, simple measures of 
success that ignore decision bias are also problematic as changing 
the tendency to classify emails as phish or genuine irrespective of 
their actual legitimacy is not the target outcome.  
Signal detection theory accounts for both false positives and 
response bias with the two main measures of sensitivity (d’) and 
bias (b). We have shown in this paper how applying this analysis 
method teases out intricate performance measures that may be 
missed when using other methods. We are aware of two other 
papers that have recently utilised signal detection theory in phish 
detection [7, 34]. Canfield et al. [7] found that participants were 
accurate in determining the correct action for phishing emails 
(deleting or marking as “spam”), but that their sensitivity to 
phishing emails was poor. Parsons et al. [34] found that participants 
aware of their participation in phishing experiments were more 
sensitive to the phishing emails. 
We are pleased that this measure is being adopted in phishing 
research, given how important the separation of sensitivity and bias 
are for realistic interventions in phishing.  
5.5 Limitations 
Although we were able to obtain a number of interesting insights 
from the study, there are two main limitations that we should 
discuss that may have affected the performance of participants. 
Firstly, the messages used for both phishing and genuine emails 
were not actually received by the participants, thus it is unclear how 
familiar they were with each email. For example, it is possible that 
some participants may be familiar with the receipt of Amazon 
emails, direct from the retailer. They could then have used this 
knowledge to help them pick up subtle cues to aid their decision 
making. Whereas other participants may be unfamiliar with 
Amazon and as a result be at a disadvantage when judging the 
veracity of emails. This is a common pitfall with lab-based phishing 
experiments and can be addressed by running “in the wild” studies, 
although these introduce other limitations. 
Secondly, participants were unable to interact directly with the 
email messages or carry out any additional checks (e.g. search for 
the company online). We addressed this issue by always having 
visible cues to allow informed decisions (see Section 3.3 for 
details). 
Finally, participants were told from the beginning that they were 
taking part in a phishing experiment. These instructions will have 
primed them to scrutinise each email more closely than perhaps 
they would do otherwise [34]. However, given that all participants 
in all conditions were subjected to these instructions then this 
should not have affected our main findings – i.e. the effects should 
be the same for all. We note that, overall, our participants may have 
shown better sensitivity to phish than those who receive fraudulent 
emails “in the wild”. Unfortunately, we cannot compare our 
findings with any normative data as sensitivity estimates are not 
available elsewhere. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we evaluated two nudges with the aim of improving 
users’ phishing detection on email clients. We found that users 
were more successful identifying phishing emails when their 
attention was drawn to the sender’s details (name and originating 
email address) and the time received when compared with the 
control condition. This is problematic, given the recent design 
trend on popular email clients to hide important sender 
information (i.e. the full originating email address) by default, 
thus potentially hindering users’ efforts when evaluating emails in 
their everyday lives. We also found strong evidence that 
individuals scoring high for dysfunctional impulsivity were at a 
disadvantage when identifying phishing emails and set this 
finding against previous published work which has been 
inconclusive about the effect of impulsive behaviour on phishing 
 identification (e.g. [28, 35]). We noted an interesting finding in 
relationship to users’ overconfidence when making decisions in 
respect of phishing emails (and underconfidence in respect of 
genuine emails) and we would encourage further research in this 
area.  Finally, we would recommend the adoption of Signal 
Detection Theory for phishing research, in particular due to 
the response bias measure that allows further scrutiny of potential 
interventions. 
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 A. APPENDIX 
A.1 Email Screenshots 
The sender saliency nudge emails used for the experiment are 
presented below.  The same set of emails were used for the control 
condition (without any mark-up), the sender saliency condition 
(without the percentage mark-up and with added highlights over the 
key metadata – see Figure 1) and the combined condition (with 
added highlights over the key metadata – see Figure 1).  
Phishing Emails 
Below are the six phishing emails, collected from existing 
messages that were found problematic by our university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Genuine Emails 
Below are the twelve genuine emails, collected by the authors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
